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Article 2

Fiduciary Duties Related to Pension
Fund Investment in Real Estate
Peter M. Kelly*

INTRODUCTION

During the extended recession of 1981-1982, traditional sources
of real estate development capital were largely unavailable.1 The
resulting search for alternative investment capital captured the
attention of the real estate development industry and set the
stage for widespread recognition of the emerging role of pension
funds as a source of institutional investment capital. This seemingly unlikely merger between the investment objectives of real
estate developers and construction lenders on the one hand, and
institutional pension fund investors on the other, actually began
to unfold at least five to ten years prior to the recent recessionary
period. 2 Thus, as with so many social or economic developments,
popular recognition of pension fund investment in real estate
serves more as a milestone marking the end of an early stage in
3
pension real estate investing.
The objectives of taxable and tax exempt real estate investors,
particularly pension funds, came together gradually. This process
accelerated the development of unique real estate investment
4
opportunities tailored to the needs of pension fund investors.
*

Partner, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Illinois; Adjunct Professor, Loyola University of

Chicago School of Law; A.B. 1970, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1973, Indiana University (Bloomington).
1. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Sept. 20, 1982, § 2, at 23, col. 4.
2.

See, e.g., MONEY MARKET DIRECTORIES, SURVEY OF REAL ESTATE INVESTING at iii-iv

(1977). See also Barth, Cordes & Watson, Economic Determinants and Implications of the
Size and Allocation of Pension Fund Capital 4648 (1980) (paper prepared for President's
Commission on Pension Policy and discussed at a research and policy conference of the
Commission held Jan. 6, 7 and 8, 1981).
3. Compare Ellis, On Pension Funds and Real Estate, PENSION WORLD, Sept. 1981, at
56, 1982 Survey: Real Estate Investing by Pension Funds, PENSION WORLD, Sept. 1982, at
15, and Profiles of Top 200 Employee Benefit Funds, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Jan.
18, 1982, at 11 with Special Report: Real Estate, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, July 7, 1980, at
13 and National Real Estate Market Developing, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Nov. 24, 1980,
at 27.
4. See Robb, New Variationsof Debt Realty Entice Investors, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT
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Such real estate investments represent an additional investment
classification which must be given serious consideration when
establishing any pension plan's investment policy. This is particularly so in light of the Employee Retirement Income Security
5
Act of 1974 (ERISA).
Pension fund investing in real estate in the post-ERISA era is
still an unfolding story. The legal framework of fiduciary duties
and liabilities under ERISA will dramatically affect the choices
of real estate investments made by pension fund fiduciaries. An
appreciation of the unique application of these rules in the real
estate context is crucial for pension fund fiduciaries who are
responsible for assessing investment opportunities and deploying
pension plan investments. Plan sponsors and others responsible
for overseeing the performance of investment fiduciaries must
also be conversant with the ERISA fiduciary rules. In addition,
real estate developers who wish to continue to participate in their
chosen profession in the face of growing institutional investor
predominance in their markets must also become familiar with
these rules.
This article will begin with a discussion of the common law
prudence standards which are preserved in and form the core of
the ERISA fiduciary rules. After examining the general prudence
standards under ERISA, this article will focus on certain additional ERISA fiduciary restrictions, including the prohibited
transaction rules and their application to real estate investments.
Finally, the article will consider current efforts to relax fiduciary
investment standards to permit pension investments in real
estate for social policy or other non-investment objectives.
TRADITIONAL TRUST LAW PRINCIPLES

A clear understanding of the ERISA fiduciary guidelines requires an understanding of pre-ERISA trust law principles. TraAGE. Mar. 1, 1982, at 42; Sojacy, Developer Adapts to Changes in the Financingof Real
Estate, PENSION & INVESTMENT AGE, Mar. 1, 1982, at 41. See also Downs, Two Contrasting
Types of Real Estate Equity, PENSION WORLD, May 1981, at 20; Garrigan, Sullivan &
Young, FinancingReal Estate Investments of Pension Funds, 1980 REAL ESTATE REV. 57;
Jones, The Convertible Mortgage: Everyone Can Be a Winner, PENSION WORLD, Mar.
1981, at 70; McNeil, Advantages of Investing in Leveraged Real Estate, PENSION WORLD.
Apr. 1982, at 31; Thorndike, Real Estate and the Institutional Investor, Pt. II, PENSION
WORLD, July 1981, at 51. Cf. BALCOR, THE BALCOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS GROUP TRUST
STUDY (1981). See also infra text accompanying notes 89-99.
5. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of Titles 5, 26,

and 29 U.S.C.).
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ditional common law trust precedents continue to have extraordinary vitality in the pension investment context.
The law of trusts originated in the feudal landholding practices of England. Initially, the trust relationship was described
with respect to specific property held for a specific use. 6 By the
early 16th century, "uses" or "trusts" were implemented-as devices to circumvent restrictions on the testamentary disposition
of real property and to defeat the claims of creditors. 7 The creditors most seriously harmed by this device were the English lords
to whom the landholder owed certain duties and fees." Consequently, the House of Lords in 1535 adopted the Statute of Uses
to restrict the use of trusts to conveyances of real property. 9 Although this statute itself was soon circumvented, its history
illustrates that the special trust rules applicable to real property
are as old as the law of trusts.10
The more modern trust relationship may be described as the
bifurcation of legal and equitable title to property. I A trustee or

6. For a good discussion of the origins of "trust" and "uses" and citations to further
authorities, see G. BOGERT. TlE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 1-6 (5th ed. 1973).
7. Id. §§ 10-11 & n.30.
8. Id.
9. Statute of Uses (27 Henry VIII, ch. 10).
10. A presumption did exist that a fiduciary was obligated to retain certain types of
real property in trust. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 190 and comments d-f

(1959). Cf. G. BOGERT, supra note 6, § 133, at 479-80 (describing trend away from this
traditional view).
The concept that different parcels of real estate with similar investment and other
characteristics might be viewed as fungible is fairly new and is still not fully developed.
The lack of major investment funds and the adoption of investment policies which select
investments falling within certain pre-established asset classifications has had the tendency to make certain high quality commercial real estate investment opportunities functionally interchangeable. While it is true that most real estate will never be considered
fungible in the most common understanding of that term, it remains a fact that an
investment manager with an ability to manage properties in major cities throughout the
U.S. may treat alternative parcels of commercial real estate with similar characteristics
as fungible.
11. The notion that pension plan fiduciaries hold legal title and are the owners of
trust property is a concept which was lost on the early advocates of social investing. Such
advocates favor investments they believe to be beneficial to the public or to particular
segments of society. In the early stages of the debate over social investing, arguments
were advanced that participants should control investments and presumably establish
social investing goals, because they, not the fiduciaries, are the owners of the trust property. See, e.g., Hearings before the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and
Remedies of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-43 (1978) (testimony of Randy Barber, Co-Director of the Peoples Business Comm.). See also P.
TROPPER & A. KAUFMAN, PENSION POWER FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1980); AFL-CIO
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dept. Report on Union Pension Fund Investments for Job Crea-
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fiduciary holds legal title to property with the legal ability to
transfer or otherwise deal with the property as an unrestricted
owner would. The interest of a trust beneficiary in the property is
an equitable claim or equitable title. 12 Traditional fiduciary duties evolved in the context of testamentary and inter vivos trusts
designed to pass designated property to a small number of beneficiaries. 13 Because competing interests frequently arose in the
same testamentary trust property, trustees were required to treat
income and principal beneficiaries equally.' 4 Generally speaking, the trustee could freely transfer or otherwise deal with the
property so long as the trustee acted prudently within the scope
of the trust powers and treated each beneficiary fairly.15 A presumption did exist, however, that a fiduciary was obligated to
retain certain types of real property in trust, absent trust language to the contrary.1 6 Thus, for example, where a testamentary trust fund included real property such as the family homestead or the site of the family business, the trustee could not
freely transfer or otherwise deal with this part of the corpus
unless the trust document so provided.
In addition, under general trust law principles a fiduciary was
obligated to avoid speculative investments.1 7 As a result, investments in second mortgages were generally precluded.' 8 Trustees
were often required to distribute the trust property over a period
which was too short for long term growth to be a significant
investment objective. Further, the risks of short term fluctuations in investment values which often accompany growthoriented investments were simply not suitable risks.

tion (1982), reprinted in 9 PENS. REP. (BNA) 311 (1982). These early advocates failed to
appreciate that under the law no amount of pressure on fiduciaries would change the fact
that they are the owners of the trust property with power to dispose of the assets and
with consequent exposure to personal liability for breaches of fiduciary duties. Compare
RF.'-TATEMENT (SECONI)OF TRUS'S § 205 (1959) with ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1976).
12. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)OF TRUSTS § 2 comment f (1959). See also G. BOGERT, supra
note 6, §§ 32, 37, at 106-16, 131-35.
13. H.R. Rhp. No. 12906, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprintedin 120 CON;. REC. H3977, at
H3983 (1974) [hereinafter cited as House Labor Rep.].
14.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF Thusis § 232 (1959).

15. Jd. § 190.
16. See supra note 10.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECoND)OF TRUS1 § 227 and comments f, u (1959).
18. Id. This rule was appropriate in the context of testamentary trusts where often the
funding of the trust occurs only once, upon the death of the settlor. Under such circumstances, preservation of principal takes on particular importance because there is no
ready source of new trust assets.
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The general principles of traditional trust law were well suited
to typical testamentary and inter vivos trusts consisting of property, including specific parcels of real property, intended for disposition over a short period of time to a small number of persons.
Although these principles were expanded or restricted by various
state legislatures,1 9 such changes presented little problem where
the situs of the trust and the decedent's state of residency produced a clear choice of the laws of a single jurisdiction familiar
to the fiduciaries. The same was not true for retirement and pension trusts. Prior to ERISA, fiduciaries appointed by multistate
companies to oversee retirement plans for employees from more
than one jurisdiction had to make investment decisions with a
view to the peculiarities of the laws of several states. The variation in fiduciary standards thus exhibited encouraged forum
shopping and created artificial barriers to uniform investment
policies among affiliated companies.
FIDUCIARY STANDARDS UNDER

ERISA

Congress sought to resolve these problems by establishing federal fiduciary standards under ERISA that would be applicable
to all retirement plans. 20 They reflect Congress' recognition of
the unique characteristics of such plans and the inadequacy of
the traditional trust laws of the different states. 2' Further, the
ERISA fiduciary standards are flexible enough to be applied to
the many varieties of retirement plans and to the investment
22
objectives of each type of plan.
The FiduciaryRules
The ERISA fiduciary rules are based upon the traditional relationship between fiduciaries and beneficiaries. When such a relationship exists, the law recognizes the beneficiary's reliance on
the good faith, skill and fair dealing of the fiduciary and imposes

19. See G.

BOGERT,

supra note 6, § 103.

20. The ERISA fiduciary standards are set forth in § 404 of the act. 29 U.S.C. § 1104
(1976).
21. See 120 CONG. REc. S15,751 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits, R., N.Y.); House Labor
Rep., supra note 13, at H3983; H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 302, reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 5038-42, 5085 [hereinafter cited as ERISA Conf. Rep.].
22. Id. For a description of various types of plans, see infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text. See also Kelly, Securities Regulation of Retirement Plans After Daniel, 10
LoY. U. CHI LJ. 631,635-40 & nn. 13-58 (1979).
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legally enforceable duties upon the latter. The most basic common law fiduciary duty, the duty to exercise prudence, 23 forms
the foundation of the ERISA fiduciary standards. 24 Prudential
27
26
duties include those of care,25 skill, caution and diversification,
and loyalty. 28 Although somewhat modified in the context of
employee benefit plans, common law prudence duties have largely survived and are applicable to retirement plans.
Care
At common law, a fiduciary responsible for plan investments
was required to investigate the wisdom of an investment with
the same degree of care and skill that a person of reasonable
prudence would apply to a similar task. 29 ERISA imposes the
same duty. 30 Moreover, this duty of care does not cease after the
acquisition of an investment. It requires ongoing consideration
of the appropriateness of the investment 3' and, where the occasion requires, may obligate a fiduciary to dispose of an unprofitable investment. 32 In addition, where a fiduciary may delegate
duties under a trust, the delegating fiduciary must use care in the
33
appointment and supervision of other fiduciaries.
The issue of a fiduciary's satisfaction of the duty of care usually arises after an alleged breach. For the fiduciary who must

23.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1957).

24. ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1976).
25. R STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227(a) comment b (1959); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404
a-1(b) (1982). See also infra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
26. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TRUSTS § 227(a) comment c (1959); 29 C.F.R.
§ 2550.404a-l (1982) (preamble), reprinted in DEP'T OF LABOR. THE PRUI)ENCE RULE AND
PENSION PLAN INVESTMENTS UNDER ERISA 13 (1980) [hereinafter cited as PRUDENCE

UNDER ERISA]. See also infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227(a) comments e-f, § 228 (1959); ERISA
§ 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1976). See also infra notes 42-63 and accompanying text.
28.

REISTATEMENT (SE(OND)OF TRUSTS § 170; ERISA

§§

404, 406(b), 29 U.S.C.

§§

1104,

1106(b) (1976); I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 4975(c)(1) (West Supp. 1982). See also infra notes 64-69 and
accompanying text.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227(a) comment b (1959).
30. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404(b) (1982).
31. See supra note 29.
32. Id.
33. At common law, a fiduciary was generally prohibited from delegating fiduciary
duties. 2 A. S(C0Tr. THiE LAW OF TRUSTS § 171 (1967). However, this general rule did not
prevent delegation of certain functions which a fiduciary could not be expected to perform personally. Id. § 171.2, at 1391-97; G. BOG;ERT supra note 6, § 555. A fiduciary delegating such functions must select and supervise its delegates in a prudent manner. Id.
See also 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, FR-17 (1982).
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demonstrate compliance with this and other prudential duties,
the maintenance of certain plan formalities will provide a
substantial degree of comfort and protection. For example, investment decisions regarding the retention or disposition of investments should be evidenced in writing, 34 and investment objectives should be established pursuant to a logical and practical
35
system.
Finally, the duty of care requires fiduciaries to conduct their
affairs in accordance with business-like procedures, including
scheduling and conducting meetings to review and monitor
investment activities. 36 All such meetings or procedures should
be memorialized in minutes or other records of actions taken by
37
such fiduciaries.
Skill
ERISA investment fiduciaries are also required to exercise the
level of skill which a reasonably prudent person would bring to
bear in investment decisions. 3 This duty to exercise the skill of
a prudent person applies even if the actual level of skill possessed
by such fiduciary is less than prudence would require. 39 Under
ERISA, however, as with the common law, a fiduciary having
greater skills than those generally required will be held to a
higher standard concomitant with the fiduciary's actual skills. 40
Further, there is evidence in ERISA case law and other ERISA
authorities to suggest that an inexperienced fiduciary may be
41
under a duty to hire an expert.

34.
35.

Cf. 29 C.F.R.
Id. at FR-4.

36.

Id.

§

2509.75-6, FR-10 (1982).

37. Id. Under ERISA, fiduciaries are entitled to a safe harbor from Department of
Labor intervention if they adopt and maintain certain basic procedures consistent with
the prudence duties. PRUDENCE UNDER ERISA, supra note 26, at 13.
38. Id. See also Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n & Glaziers & Glassworkers Pension
Plan, 507 F. Supp. 378, 384 (D. Hawaii, 1980) (fiduciaries are required by ERISA "to
conduct their activities as would a prudent man under similar circumstances."); Kievan,
FiduciaryResponsibility Under ERISA's Prudent Man Rule: What are the Guideposts?,
39.

See supra note 38.

40. Id.
41. Where inexperienced plan fiduciaries failed to follow procedures used by prudent
lenders, they violated their duty to act with skill and care. Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n
& Glaziers & Glassworkers Pension Plan, 507 F. Supp. 378, 384 (D. Hawaii, 1980). The
evaluation of risks which should occur before plan assets are committed to lending ventures was elicited through expert testimony. By holding fiduciaries liable for failing to
make the same necessary evaluation, the court indicated that prior consultation with an
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Caution and Diversification
At common law, fiduciaries were obligated to avoid speculative
investments. 42 For this reason, many jurisdictions prohibited
investments of trust assets in second mortgages. 43 Under ERISA,
44
however, there is greater flexibility with respect to investments.
For example, there is no reason to believe that second mortgages
cannot be appropriate pension or retirement plan investments
under proper circumstances. 45 Nor should the duty of caution
prevent ERISA investment fiduciaries from taking investment
risks. The ERISA standards posit a duty of caution that is
46
consistent with the whole portfolio or modern portfolio theory.
Under this theory, the prudence of a particular investment is
evaluated in light of the overall plan portfolio. The relative
riskiness of a single investment is not the sole measure of
prudence, and compliance with the duty of caution is not judged
solely by the ultimate investment result. Rather, the fiduciary's
conduct is evaluated in light of the circumstances prevailing at
the time the investment decision is made, particularly the invest47
ment alternatives then available.

expert may be required to fulfill the duty of skill and care. Id. See also Klevan, supra note
38, at 154: "[I]f
the plan is of such a size and nature that prudent men acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would hire professional money managers, the
trustee may well ponder whether he would not be deemed to be imprudent in trying to go
it alone." Klevan states that the "general tenor of ERISA is very much toward the
encouragement of the hiring of professional money managers." Id.
managers." Id.
The obligation to hire an expert may have particular relevance in the real estate field
because of the lack of real estate investment experience on the part of many traditional
retirement plan fiduciaries. For a more complete discussion of ERISA and real estate
investment, see infra notes 83-141 and accompanying text.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227(a) comments e-f, § 228 (1959).
43. For a collection of state law authorities, see 3 A. ScoTr, supra note 33, § 227.7, at
1818-20. See also supra note 18.
44. Cf.PRUDENCE UNDER ERISA, supra note 26, at 12.
45. Id. See also authorities cited supra note 4.
46. See supra notes 4, 44.
47. See, e.g., Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n & Glaziers & Glassworkers Pension Plan,
507 F. Supp. 378, 384-85 (D. Hawaii, 1980). See also the Department of Labor's safe harbor rules wherein it has concluded:
(1) Generally, the relative riskiness of a specific investment or investment
course of action does not render such investment or investment course of action
per se imprudent, and
(2) The prudence of an investment decision should not be judged without regard
to the role the proposed investment or investment course of action plays within
the overall plan portfolio.
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Although the duty of caution is measured on a facts and
circumstances basis, certain generalizations are possible. For
example, because the availability of long-term permanent financing is frequently uncertain, it may well prove imprudent for a
plan to invest in construction loans without a commitment for a
permanent loan take out or additional guarantees to protect the
plan's investment. Similarly, plan investors should avoid investments in untried enterprises or in mortgages on single or multifamily residential developments which tend to be highly speculative and too risky for other investors. 48 If, however, the potential
return on such an investment is sufficiently high to justify the
49
risk, then it may fulfill some role in a pension portfolio plan.
ERISA investment fiduciaries are also under a duty to diversify
plan investments unless it is clearly prudent not to do so.5 0 The
legislative history of ERISA indicates that the plaintiff who
asserts a non-diverse investment practice has the burden of
51
proving that the investments have in fact not been diverse.
Once this is satisfied, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant
fiduciary who then must prove that the non-diverse investment
practice is prudent. 5 2 If the defendant fiduciary fails to do so,
53
personal liability for breach of trust may result.
As with the duty of caution, the duty of diversification is not

PRUDENCE UNDER ERISA, supra note 26, at 12.
48. See supra note 47.
49. The movement toward social policy investing has been criticized because of the
riskiness attached to the suggested investments. For example, many social investment
proposals involve investments in untried enterprises or mortgages on single or multifamily residences. Such investments have risk characteristics which are too substantial or
which provide an inadequate return when compared with alternative investment opportunities. Compare Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly and Business
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,96th Cong., 1st Sess. P&II, 2-25 (testimony
of Ian Lanoff and Morton Klevan) [hereinafter cited as DOL Testimony] with Cavuto,
Social Investing Debate Rages On, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE. Dec. 8,1980, at 31, Raskin, Pension Funds Could Be the Unions' Secret Weapon, FORTUNE. Dec. 31, 1979, at 64
and Plumbers'MortgageProgramMay Run Afoul of Pension Law, CRAIN'S CHICAGO BUSINESS, Apr. 20, 1981, at 23. While it is fair to say that there may be some role for such
investments in a pension portfolio, the potential return on such investments should be
sufficiently high to justify such risks.
50. ERISA § 404(aXlXc), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(c) (1976): "[A] fiduciary shall discharge
his duties with respect to a plan ...by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to
minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not
to do so;..."
51. ERISA Conf. Rep., supra note 21, at 304.
52. Id.
53. ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1976).
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readily reduceable to a formula; it turns on particular facts and
circumstances. 54 To assist fiduciaries in their investment practices, certain percentage guidelines have emerged as standards
against which diversification will be measured. 55 This is particularly true in the case of real estate investments and mortgages.
Although the ERISA Conference Committee Report does not
list any fixed percentages, it does provide the following factors
for consideration: 1) plan purposes; 2) amount of plan assets;
3) financial and industrial conditions; 4) type of investment,
whether mortgages, bonds or shares of stock or otherwise;
5) distribution as to geographical location; 6) distribution as to
industry; and 7) dates of maturity.5 6 Despite this language from
the Conference Committee Report, the Department of Labor, in
interpreting the ERISA standards, appears to have given some
credence to an earlier committee report regarding other possible
parameters. The House Education and Labor Committee Report, which
accompanied the provisions later reflected in the ERISA diversification standards, stated that there seemed to be no restriction on
a fiduciary "investing as much as 25% of trust assets in one type
of securities, like real estate in a particular locale or securities of
a particular industry." 57 The Department of Labor apparently
agrees that this twenty-five percent test of investment concentration is the outer parameter of what will prove acceptable. 58 Thus,
compliance with ERISA diversification standards appears to
require diversification as to locale, type of investment and purposes, with no more than twenty-five percent of asset concentra59
tion in any one investment.

54. ERISA Conf. Rep., supra note 21, at 304.
55. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
56. ERISA Conf. Rep., supra note 21, at 304.
57. House Labor Rep., supra note 13, at H3983.
58. See Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n & Glaziers & Glassworkers Pension Plan, 507
F. Supp. 378 (23% of plan assets committed to a real estate loan); Dep't of Labor Opinion
Letter to Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Investment Trusts, Inc. (Dec. 7, 1978)(underlying
invested in mortgage loans pertaining to a specific parcel). But cf., Marshall v. First
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Waco, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 241, at G4 (Dec. 1981)
(consent order reducing plan investment concentration in residential mortgages from
approximately 90% to 30%). This case is not strong precedent for a standard greater than
25%. Rather, it reflects a pragmatic litigation settlement which resulted in holdings
slightly in excess of the 25% threshold.
approximately 90% to 30%). This case is not strong precedent for a standard greater than
25%. Rather, it reflects a pragmatic litigation settlement which resulted in holdings
slightly in excess of the 25% threshold.
59. In the real estate context, these standards may create some difficulties with direct
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In general, the obligation to diversify plan investments applies
to each investment fiduciary. 611As the legislative history of
ERISA indicates, however, where there are multiple investment
fiduciaries, each responsible for a particular type of investment,
the duty of each fiduciary to diversify is somewhat different than
would ordinarily be the case. 61 In compliance with the investment
objectives implicit in such split funding, each investment fiduciary is permitted to concentrate investments with respect to
type. Diversification must then occur within each particular type
62
of investment.
For example, the investment practices of a fiduciary responsible
for investing in long-term bonds will not be subject to scrutiny as
long as that investment fiduciary selects a diversified portfolio of
such bonds.6 3 Such investments would, however, be subject to
challenge on a diversification basis if an excessive percentage of
the bond portfolio represented the bonds of a particular industry
or those of companies located in a particular area. Similarly, an
excessive concentration of either bonds with similar maturity
dates unrelated to the particular liquidity needs of the fund, or
bonds purchased during a certain period of time may be subject
to attack.
Finally, although a fiduciary is bound to use caution in choosing investments and to diversify investment choices, he or she
does not commit a per se breach of fiduciary duty for failure to
do so. Rather, the ERISA standards provide the flexibility necessary to allow a fiduciary to take risks and to make limited concentrated investments.
Loyalty to Plan Purposes
ERISA requires investment fiduciaries to discharge ERISA
duties with the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to plan

placement of investments. Thus, for a handful of large pension funds, the best and possibly the only way to achieve a diversified investment in real estate equities or real estate
mortgages would be through participation in one or more commingled funding vehicles.
For a discussion of this and the exception to the diversification standard for certain classifications of real estate investments, see infra notes 83-108 and accompanying text.
60. ERISA Conf. Rep., supra note 21, at 304-05. See also ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C.
§ 110 4(a)(1XC) (1976); see supra note 50 for text of§ 11 0 4(a)(1)(C).
61. ERISA Conf. Rep., supra note 21, at 304-05 (split funding).
62. id.
63. See supra note 60.
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participants and their beneficiaries and deferring the cost of
maintaining the plan.6 4 In the context of retirement and pension
plans, this exclusive purpose test is applied solely with reference
retirement. 65
to the plan participants' economic best interest at
Non-economic objectives or economic objectives which would curnot appropriate criteria for
rently benefit plan participants 6are
6
decisionmaking.
plan investment
During the recent recessionary period, investors have pushed
for permission to use pension funds to invest in real estate projects. Such investments would help create jobs for the construction industry and provide funds for home mortgage loans.
Although these objectives are laudable, such investments provide a current economic benefit and involve investment in real
estate on terms less favorable to the plan than the prevailing
terms in the mortgage market. Such practices clash with the
ERISA objective of providing retirement benefits on a secure
economic basis.6 7 Any current benefit provided through such
social investing has a tendency to erode the basic purpose of a
retirement plan: to protect plan participants during their retirement years against the fundamental risk that they may live
longer than their retirement resources last.
The need to provide investment alternatives to help stimulate
the economy has not gone unnoticed. Legislative exceptions and
exemptions to the ERISA rules now permit social investment on
terms no less favorable to the plan than would be available from
alternative investments.6 8 However, such investments are still
inappropriate if a prudent person would not make the investrate of return
ment because the risk is too great or because 6the
9
return.
of
rate
market
the
than
available is less

64. ERISA § 404 (a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1976).
65. DOL Testimony, supra note 49, at 2-25. For a collection of relevant cases, see
Gertner, Socially Responsible Investments for ERISA Employee Benefit Plans: The
North Shall Not Rise Again, in NON-TRADITIONAL. INVESTMENTS I-1, 11-4 to 11-7 (programs
presented by ABA Section of Real Prop., Probate and Trust Law, Dallas, Tex., Aug. 13,
1979).
66. DOL Testimony, supra note 49, at 2-25.
67. ERISA was designed to protect plan participants against fiduciary abuses and
inappropriate investment practices. See ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(b) (1976 & Supp.
V 1981).
68. See infra notes 100-41 and accompanying text.
69. The duty of loyalty is also reflected in express self-dealing restrictions found in the
prohibited transactions provisions of ERISA. See infra notes 85-99 and accompanying
text.
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Duty to Follow Plan

The creator of a trust at common law had extensive powers to
vary the normal prudential duties of fiduciaries. 70 Under ERISA,
investment fiduciaries are not entitled to the same blanket
exemption from fiduciary standards in complying with instructions or directions in a plan or trust document. ERISA includes
an express duty to follow the terms of the plan, subject to certain
statutory standards.7 Such standards provide that a fiduciary
shall discharge his duties solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries, and in accordance with the plan's governing documents only to the extent they are consistent with
ERISA.72 Under these broad standards, a fiduciary should follow plan directions only so long as those directions are prudent.
Similarly, a fiduciary should diversify investments, not become
involved in prohibited transactions or self-dealing, and otherwise
comply with ERISA requirements regardless of contrary plan
provisions.
The provision limiting a fiduciary's duties to actions that comply
strictly with ERISA would appear to significantly restrict the
ability of an employer establishing a plan to vary the ERISA
fiduciary standards. However, other provisions of ERISA contain broad exceptions to the general limitations. As already
noted, an employer may establish a plan designed primarily for
investment or payment of plan benefits in the form of employer
securities.7 3 This is an exception to ERISA's diversification
standards and to the restrictions on investments in employer
74
securities and self-dealing.
The foregoing federal fiduciary standards were designed to
help alleviate the problems that traditional trust law principles
created for trustees. To further that purpose, Congress made
them applicable to all types of retirement plans. Fortunately, the
rules are flexible enough to permit vastly different investment
policies geared to the particular objectives of different types of
ERISA plans.

70.

71.
72.
73.
74.
other
notes

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227(c) comments q-w (1959).

ERISA § 404(a)(1XD), 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(D) (1976).
Id.
See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
ERISA §§ 404, 406-407, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1106-1107 (1976). There are also many
exceptions. This article, however, will focus on real estate exceptions. See infra
100-41 and accompanying text.
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Types of Plans
One type of plan subject to ERISA fiduciary rules is the "welfare" plan, which provides participants with medical, disability,
death or various other benefits.7 5 An element common to all
such programs is the provision of current protection or current
benefits to employees. Most of these programs are either unfunded
or funded through a trust or other investment accumulation vehicle dealing typically in short term cash equivalent investments. Generally speaking, a significant investment of welfare
fund assets in long term investments subject to fluctuations in
value would appear to be inappropriate in light of the need for
76
liquidity in such programs.
Stock bonus plans, employee stock ownership plans and certain other programs may be established to provide retirement or
deferred compensation benefits. 77 Such programs are designed
with the intention that plan assets or benefit payments will take
the form of securities of the employer sponsoring the plan or its
affiliates.7 8 Of course, the investment policy of such a program
must take into account the need to implement the trust purpose
of investing or paying benefits in the form of such securities.
Profit sharing and money purchase pension plans also confer
retirement or deferred compensation benefits.7 9 These are defined
contribution plans in which the employer's obligation to extend
plan benefits is satisfied upon deposit of the employer's contributions to the plan.8 0 Each participant's interest in the plan is
reflected in one or more individual account balance which must
be adjusted each year to reflect the current market value of the
participant's share of plan assets.8 1 In defined contribution plans,
the risk of adverse investment performance rests with the plan
participants and not with the employer who established or contributed to the plan. Thus, employee participants in a defined
75. ERISA §§ 3(1), 3(3), 401, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1), 1002(3), 1101 (1976).
76. Cf. Klevan, supra note 38, at 154-55.
77. I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 409A (West Supp. 1982); ERISA §§ 404(a)(2), 407(d)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1104(a)(2), 1107(d)(3) (1976). See infra note 78 and accompanying text for other eligible
individual account plans.
78. ERISA Conf. Rep., supra note 25, at 312-13. See also ERISA §§ 402(a)(2), 407(d)(3),
29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(2), 1107(d)(3) (1976). See generally I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 409A (West Supp.
1982).
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(ii) (1960).
80. I.R.C. § 414(i) (W. Supp. 1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(ii) (1960); Rev. Rul. 125,
1970-1 C.B. 87; Rev. Rul. 103, 1973-1 C.B. 191; Rev. Rul. 340, 1974-2 C.B. 128.
81.

See supra note 80.
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contribution plan are likely to show great interest in how plan
assets are invested because their future financial security may be
significantly affected by such investment decisions.
In establishing investment policies for defined contribution
plans, fiduciaries should consider the age distribution of plan
participants. For example, if the participants as a group are
fairly old and close to retirement, an investment policy which
minimizes the risk of investment fluctuations and maximizes the
security of principal may be required. Conversely, where the plan
covers a fairly young workforce, the investment policy may better emphasize the growth potential of the plan's investment
portfolio.
Not surprisingly, many plans cover a diverse workforce of
both young and old employees whose best interests may be
served by different investment policies. The traditional response
to this problem has been to balance investments so as to address
the needs of both groups. However, a number of employers have
responded in a more creative fashion by offering older employees
an opportunity to elect to segregate their account balances for
investment purposes. This option allows employees to choose
from among several different investment funds, including at
least one fixed income fund which may or may not have an
investment return guarantee from an insurance company.8 2
Other typical fund alternatives include equity funds and funds
intended to be balanced between fixed income and equity
investments.
Defined benefit pension plans provide for a definite or determinable benefit payable to plan participants who perform a
required period of service or work until retirement.8 3 The amount
of the plan benefit for an individual plan participant is determined according to plan provisions, which in general contain a
benefit formula based upon service, compensation or other factors. As long as sufficient assets are contributed to the plan and
the plan remains in effect, plan participants will be entitled to
receive the formula benefit determined with respect to their service or compensation, regardless of the adverse effects of investment losses.8 4 The risk of adverse investment experience lies
primarily with the employer who has committed to providing the

82.
83.
84.

Cf. ERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 110 4(c) (1976).
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(bXlXi) (1960); I.R.C. § 411 (West. Supp. 1982).
Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-4(a) (1977).
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benefits described in the plan benefit formula.
With the exception of frozen or terminated plans or plans covering an older workforce, the investment portfolio of most defined
benefit plans usually includes some investments designed to
achieve growth over a long term period. Under such plans, pension investment fiduciaries can take advantage of investment
opportunities which require long term financial commitments,
such as real estate investments. Indeed, of all the many types of
retirement plans, defined benefit pension plans appear to hold
the greatest promise of future funding for real estate investors.
The enactment of federal fiduciary standards and their applicability to all types of retirement plans evidences Congress'
attempt to cure the inadequacies of traditional trust standards as
applied to modern investment plans. Under ERISA, Congress
also sought to protect investors further from abusive or selfdealing investment situations and, therefore, prohibited fiduciaries from participating in certain transactions.
ProhibitedTransactions
Prior to ERISA, qualified retirement plans were subject to
prohibited transaction rules contained in the Internal Revenue
Code.8 5 These rules generally allowed dealings between a plan
and a party related to the plan as long as the plan's investment
was adequately secured and the plan paid no more than adequate consideration for a related investment.8 6 Under ERISA,
Congress imposed a series of absolute prohibitions designed to
prevent extensive dealings between a plan and parties related to
the plan.8 7 These rules reflect situations which Congress considered either per se abusive, or subject to such extensive selfdealing possibilities that a general prohibition was necessary.
Because Congress recognized that an absolute prohibition could
be construed as overreaching, it enacted a series of specific statutory exemptions.88 In addition, it provided a procedure whereby
further exemptions could be granted by administrative action.8 9 A
complete analysis of the prohibited transaction restrictions and
the exemptions to those restrictions is beyond the scope of this
85. I.R.C. § 503 (West Supp. 1982).
86. Id.
87. ERISA §§ 406-407, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106-1107 (1976); I.R.C. § 4975 (West Supp. 1982).
88. ERISA §§ 407, 408(b)-(e), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108(b)-(e) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); I.R.C.
§ 4975(c)(3), (d) (West Supp. 1982). See also ERISA Conf. Rep., supra note 21, at 309-11.
89. ERISA § 408(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (1976); I.R.C. § 4975(c)(2) (West Supp. 1982).
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article. Certain situations arise in the context of plan investments in real estate, however, which present prohibited transaction issues appropriate for discussion here.
Many larger plans have considered or are involved in direct
investment in real estate, or in indirect investment through
commingled funds. Direct investment often involves one or more
plans extending permanent mortgage loan financing for commercial or other properties. Plan investment fiduciaries typically
structure such investments to provide a fixed rate of return,
which may be less than the market rate for a permanent loan.
Plan fiduciaries usually insist upon and receive a right to some
equity participation in the project. In some cases, equity participation means an option to obtain a portion or all of the equity
interests in the project at some future date; in others, it means an
additional interest geared to the appreciation value of the equity
interest or to increased cash flows from rents, commonly called
an equity kicker. This investment is considerably more attractive
than a fixed rate mortgage, since the plan participates in equity
while enjoying significant cash flow through the fixed rate of
return.
Such investments have been particularly successful because
few other investors compete for this piece of the real estate
investment pie. Taxable investors 90 tend to look to real estate as
a source of tax shelter, 9 1 particularly during the construction
phase. Because plans do not pay taxes, 92 it would seem inappropriate under most circumstances for plans to compete for
investment opportunities having tax shelter characteristics. Plan
involvement in permanent financing with equity participation,
however, has provided downstream investment capital for taxable investors which might otherwise be unavailable. 93 The division of investments between taxable and non-taxable investors
in real estate has become the market standard. It has resulted in

90. Taxable investors refers primarily to individuals, but may also include other taxable entities.
91. Real estate investing is often attractive to taxable investors because heavy front
end costs typically lead to early losses for which income tax deductions may be available.
Thus, real estate investments have been used to shelter other taxable income.
92. Qualified plans and trusts are exempt from income tax under I.R.C. § 501 (West
Supp. 1982).
93. Such capital may be unavailable because these investments, unlike construction
phase investments, lack tax shelter characteristics. To the extent possible, taxable investors invest in the early stages of a real estate venture and seek ways to liquidate their
interest before income flows begin to surpass expenses.
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a symbiotic relationship which has sustained many real estate
projects during the recent recessionary period.
This new type of pension investment in real estate has presented certain prohibited transaction issues, particularly where
the permanent lender to a large plan utilizes the services of institutional fiduciaries across the country. ERISA forbids any sale,
exchange, lease, extension of credit, or furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between a plan and a party-in-interest.9 4 The
definition of a party-in-interest is wide-ranging. It includes an
employer, its affiliates, its officers, directors, employees, shareholders holding ten percent or more of its stock, and any trusts it
may control.9 5 Unions or anyone providing fiduciary or nonfi96
duciary services to the plan would also be parties-in-interest.
Thus, it is sometimes difficult to find construction lenders who
are not parties-in-interest to the plan providing permanent
financing. Construction lenders are normally repaid their construction loan gradually, as the permanent loan becomes funded
upon completion or substantial completion of the project. Where
the permanent lender is a plan and the construction lender is a
party-in-interest to the plan, this "takeout" of the construction
lender by the permanent lender could constitute a prohibited
transaction. Without the benefit of an exemption, a takeout could
constitute a transfer of plan assets for an extension of credit
between a plan and a party-in-interest.9 7 A number of prohibited
transactions exemptions have been applied for and granted
because of this problem, including several initiated by the
author.9 8 Further, the Department of Labor has just released a
proposed class exemption which, if adopted in its present form,
should alleviate the need for such individual exemptions. 9

94. ERISA § 406(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a) (1976); I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1) (West Supp. 1982).
95. ERISA § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(14) (1976); I.R.C. § 4975(eX2) (West Supp. 1982).
96. Id.
97. See ERISA § 406(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(D) (1976); I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D)
(West Supp. 1982).
98. See, e.g., Prohibited Transaction Exemption (P.T.E.) 82-39, 47 Fed. Reg. 7551
(1982); P.T.E. 82-177, 47 Fed. Reg. 49753-54 (1982).
99. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. Other unusual prohibited transaction issues have been presented where plans have invested in real estate as the permanent lender with equity participation or equity positions. Typically, a plan holding an
equity position does so in conjunction with a taxable investor who actively manages the
property. A number of prohibited transaction issues arise in such circumstances, either
with respect to leasing building space to a party-in-interest, providing services by the
taxable joint venturer, or including an affiliate of the taxable joint venturer in the occupancy and leasing of space in the building. Prohibited transaction issues can also arise
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EXEMPTIONS AND EXEMPTION TRENDS
SIMPLIFYING PENSION FUND INVESTMENT
IN REAL ESTATE

Several exemptions have been issued and others are contemplated which may simplify real estate investing by pension
funds. Over the last several years, Congress has considered proposals which would have the effect of streamlining prohibited
transaction exemptions, and restoring to some extent the pre-

ERISA standard of adequate consideration and adequate security. 1° Those exemptions and certain other major developments
which have been discussed in the press or in public are worthy of
note.
Insuranceand Other Commingled

Real Estate Funds
The Department of Labor has issued two class exemptions
from the prohibited transaction rules which permit insurance
companies and bank trust departments that maintain commingled funds, including real estate funds, to engage in transactions with persons or entities that are parties-in-interest to plans
investing in such funds.' 0 ' These exemptions apply so long as

the interest in the real estate fund of those plans related to
parties-in-interest is not greater than five percent.'0 2 Although
modified exemptions exist with respect to plans holding more
than five percent of a commingled real estate fund, 10 3 insurance
companies and trust departments taking advantage of this class
exemption have in practice restricted plan participation to no
greater than five percent of the total fund.

with respect to purchases of real estate equity from parties-in-interest. ERISA § 406(a)(1XA),
29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(A) (1976); I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1982).
100. See e.g., S.1541, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (introduced by Sen. Nickles, R.
Okla.); H.R. 4330, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (introduced by Rep. Erlenborn, R. Ill.).
While these bills died with the end of the 97th Congress, all indications are that new bills
will be submitted early in 1983 which have a strong likelihood of passage during the 98th
Congress.
101. P.T.E. 78-19, 43 Fed. Reg. 59915-20 (1978); P.T.E. 80-51, 45 Fed. Reg. 49709-17
(1980).
102. See supra note 101.
103. Id. It should be noted that a number of large funds have invested the portion of
their portfolio intended for real estate in a number of commingled funds. Some of the
largest funds have failed to exhaust their real estate investment needs in this manner.
This has been one of the moving forces behind the tendency on the part of very large
retirement funds to become involved directly in real estate investments.
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Qualifying Employer Real Property
ERISA also contains a statutory exemption from the prohibited transaction rules and from the diversification limitations
which permits the i.vestment of plan assets in so-called qualifying employer real property. 10 4 Qualifying employer real property
is real property which is purchased from and leased back to the
employer who maintains the plan or to an affiliate of that
employer. The real estate must consist of a substantial number
of parcels that are disbursed geographically, and the parcels and
the improvements thereon must be suitable (or adaptable with10 5
out excessive cost) to more than one use.
The requirement that there be a substantial number of parcels
geographically disbursed has been interpreted liberally. In one
case, six parcels, each separated by eighty miles, satisfied the
requirement.1 0 6 In another ruling, three parcels were a substan10 7
tial number when geographically disbursed within three states.
Similarly, the multiple use requirement has been satisfied where
the subject properties were small office or light industry build08
ings, or even fast food restaurants.
ParticipantLoans
Although a loan between a plan and a party-in-interest is
ordinarily prohibited,'0 9 the prohibited transaction rules expressly
exempt loans to plan participants within certain parameters. 110
As modified by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982,111 the Internal Revenue Code now provides a disincentive
to particular participant loans; that is, participant loans in
excess of $50,000 or with terms longer than five years will be
taxable to the plan participant.1 1 2 Loans made to plan partici104. ERISA §§ 406(a)(1)(E), 407, 408(e), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(1)(E), 1107, 1108(e) (1976);
I.R.C. § 4975(d)(13) (West Supp. 1982).
105. ERISA § 407(d)(2), (d)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(2), (d)(4) (1976).
106. Dep't of Labor Pension & Welfare Benefit Programs, ERISA Op. letter 75-111
(Wash. Serv. Bureau Sept. 26, 1975).
107. Dep't of Labor Pension & Welfare Benefit Programs, ERISA Op. letter 77-1
(Wash. Serv. Bureau Feb. 18, 1977).
108.

See supra notes 106-07.

109. ERISA § 406(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(B) (1976); I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(B) (West
Supp. 1982).
110. ERISA § 408(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); I.R.C. § 4975(d)(1)
(West Supp. 1982).
111. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 42
U.S.C.).
112. I.R.C. § 72(p) (West Supp. 1982).
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pants to finance the purchase or improvement of their primary
residence or that of a dependent, however, will not be subject to
the five-year rule. 113 In addition, plan participants may receive
residential loans or other mortgage loans if made as part of the
plan's, investment policy. This latter exception is not clearly
spelled out in the statute, but is based upon the legislative history of the recent tax amendments."' The legislative history
indicates further that apart from the stated exemptions, the
15
prohibited transaction rules will still be fully applicable. 5
Multiple Services
Prohibited transaction issues also arise when persons who
provide one type of service with respect to a plan begin rendering
additional services. 1 6 The same problem arises when a fiduciary
performs multiple fiduciary or nonfiduciary services under a
plan. In the real estate context, a prohibited transaction can
result where property management, leasing, or other property
services are provided by a party-in-interest. Statutory and administrative exemptions generally permit many such services where
they are necessary. 11
The provision of additional services by fiduciaries must be
approved by an independent fiduciary." 8 Exempt multiple services must be rendered for reasonable compensation, and the
services are subject to cancellation on short notice by the plan. A
fiduciary performing additional services is obligated to disclose
certain materials regarding its activities." 9 In addition, ERISA
expressly permits the performance of additional services by fiduciaries without compensation 120 and the provision of ancillary
bank services by a bank acting as a fiduciary.' 2' A person pro-

113.

Id.

114.

See H.R. REP. No.760, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 620 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Coi)E

CONG. & Al). NEWS
115. Id.

116. ERISA § 406(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 116(a)(1)(c) (1976); I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(C) (West
Supp. 1982).
117. ERISA § 408(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); I.R.C. § 4975(d)(2)
(West Supp. 1982); P.T.E. 77-9, 42 Fed. Reg. 32,395 (1977) (amended by 44 Fed. Reg. 1479,
52,365 (1979)).
118. P.T.E. 77-9, 42 Fed. Reg. 32,395 (1977) (amended by 44 Fed. Reg. 1479, 52,365
(1979)).
119. Id.
120. ERISA § 408(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c) (1976); I.R.C. § 4975(d)(11) (West Supp. 1982).
121. ERISA § 408(b)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(6) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); I.R.C. § 4975(d)(6)
(West Supp. 1982).
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viding services to a plan, who is a full-time employee of the
employer maintaining the plan, may not receive compensation
from the plan in addition to the salary or wage he is entitled to
122
from the employer.
ProfessionalManager and Mortgage Class Exemptions
The Department of Labor has recently released a proposed
class exemption for qualified professional asset managers. 123 This
administrative action would effect an exemption from the prohibited transaction rules where a professional asset manager determines that a particular investment is in the best interests of plan
participants, and where the professional asset manager is not
benefitted by the decision.124 Once such a class exemption is
issued, many individual exemptions presently applied for may
no longer be required.
A class exemption permitting certain mortgage pool trust certificates to be issued and purchased without regard to the prohi-

bited transaction problems was released in

1981.125

This pro-

posed exemption was recently expanded and finalized to include
loan commitments (as opposed to contemporaneous loans) and
126
loans for second mortgages.
A class exemption permitting certain mortgage financing
arrangements for new single family residential properties has
also been issued recently. 127 This exemption permits mortgage
participations or direct mortgage loans with respect to such
1 28
properties.
Plan Asset Regulations
The prohibited transaction rules involve a number of restrictions regarding the handling of plan assets. The transfer, sale,
lending or lease of plan assets to or among parties-in-interest is
generally prohibited. 129 Thus, the determination of what consti-

122. ERISA § 408(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c) (1976); I.R.C. § 4975(d)(10) (West Supp. 1982).
123. Qualified Professional Asset Managers Proposed Exemption, 47 Fed. Reg. 56,945
(proposed Dec. 21, 1982).
124. Id.
125. P.T.E. 81-7, 46 Fed. Reg. 7,520-27 (1981).
126. P.T.E. 82-87, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,331-39 (1982).
127. Id.
128.

Id.

129. ERISA § 406(a)(1)(A), (B), (D), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(A), (B), (D) (1976); I.R.C.
§ 4975(c)(1)(A), (B), (D) (West Supp. 1982).
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tutes a plan asset may be extremely important in determining
whether the prohibited transaction rules have been followed.
Many real estate investments take the form of limited partnerships. Immediately following the enactment of ERISA, the
Department of Labor issued an interpretive release which took
the position that the underlying assets in most limited partnership situations would not constitute plan assets. 130 Thus, prohibited transaction issues ordinarily would not arise with respect to
the partnership's dealings. But the labor department began to
change its position in 1979.131 Its proposed regulations now generally suggest that the underlying assets of a limited partnership
would indeed constitute plan assets subject to the prohibited
transaction restrictions. 132 These proposed plan asset regulations
have discouraged many real estate investments, particularly
those involving limited partnership interests, and have been the
source of much controversy.
A non-controversial portion of the proposed asset regulations,
which deals solely with certain governmental mortgage certificates issued under the Ginnie Mae and Fannie Mae programs,
has now been issued in final form.1 33 The regulations indicate
that the requirement that plan assets be held in trust will generally be satisfied by the holding of a limited partnership or other
certificate in trust, even if the underlying assets of a limited
partnership would be deemed to constitute plan assets. 134 The
issue of what will constitute plan assets has been deferred for
35
further regulations or exemptions.'
Public statements and official pronouncements of the Department of Labor on the issue of pension investment in limited
partnerships indicate that the department is rethinking the position it took in the proposed regulations. In addition, the department has stated that, pending finalization of the proposed regulations, it will continue to honor the position expressed in the
earlier interpretive release. 136 It is suggested that the department

130. ERISA I.B. 75-2 (interpretive bulletin) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-2 (1982)).
131. 44 Fed. Reg. 50,363-67 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550) (proposed Aug. 28,1979).
132. Id.
133. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.401b-1(1982).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 7,521 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 38,084 (1980) (preamble). The
Department has indicated, however, that any final regulations inconsistent with the
interpretive release will be prospective only. Id.
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should fundamentally rethink its proposed position and opt
instead for the common sense approach taken in the release.
Individual Exemption Trends
The issuance of individual exemptions has also simplified
pension fund investment in real estate. The Department of Labor
will sometimes exempt sales of undeveloped land, or of improved
property by a plan, to a plan sponsor or party-in-interest if current independent appraisals value the property, and its highest
and best use, at no more than the purchase price offered by the
party-in-interest. 13 7 Factors which would lead the Department of
Labor to issue such exemptions include whether the continued
holding of the property by the plan is not desirable, and whether
138
the party-in-interest is prepared to pay cash.
Other factors influence whether a sale by and a lease-back to a
party-in-interest will be exempted from the prohibited transaction rules. The value of the property and the terms of the lease as
determined by an independent trustee or appraiser have to be
favorable to the plan. In addition, the property can only comprise a small percentage of the assets; the rate of return on the
lease must be favorable to the plan; and the plan should share in
any potential appreciation to the value of the property. Finally,
the plan sponsor or other party-in-interest should guarantee
against default on the lease or against loss in value on the con139
tributed property.
Several factors are also significant in reviewing individual
exemptions. The Department of Labor will often grant a onetime exemption to permit disposition of pre-ERISA investments
that are no longer appropriate plan investments. 140 The department may condition exemptive relief, however, upon the existence of independent safeguards in situations where a party-ininterest wields great influence over plan investment decisions.

137. BNA Pension Rep. No. 298, Spec. Supp. 42, at 43, 44 (July 7, 1980) (speech by
Morton Klevan, Deputy Administrator of Dep't of Labor Pension and Welfare Benefit
Programs, Mar. 18, 1980).
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., P.T.E. 79-72, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,595 (1979); P.T.E. 79-59, 44 Fed. Reg. 5901314 (1979); P.T.E. 79-51, 44 Fed. Reg. 54,795 (1979); P.T.E. 7949, 44 Fed. Reg. 54,789-90
(1979).
140. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
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Such safeguards would include guarantees of value in the event
of default, limitations to twenty-five percent or less of plan assets
to be invested, and the use of independent trustees or other independent fiduciaries to monitor ongoing transactions.1 4 1
CONCLUSION

This article has described the legal duties and responsibilities
of fiduciaries under ERISA, particularly as they relate to real
property investments. In assessing these fiduciary standards, it
is important to remember that most of the rules deal with minimum levels of conduct which will prevent a judicial determination of fiduciary liability. A fiduciary satisfies the rules when he
or she complies with the standard of conduct set by other fiduciaries operating under the same circumstances.
This market standard for conduct may tend to produce a herd
instinct among fiduciaries. Anyone familiar with pension investment practices has certainly experienced pension fiduciaries who
express a greater willingness to invest in a particular type of
investment once they discover that others are doing the same.
While this herd instinct can be criticized, it has some basis in
law. The phenomenon of the herd providing protection from liability is ultimately a reflection of the fact that in our legal system
judicial officers often use common practices in the field to assess
standards of conduct. Judges are not comfortable with displacing the judgment of experts in fields with which they are
unfamiliar.
Hence, if the objective of an investment fiduciary is to avoid
liability, there is some safety in numbers. However, an investment fiduciary who conducts his or her affairs so as to avoid
drastic missteps and to minimize exposure to liability is not confronting the larger issue. In the practical world of retirement and
pension fund investing, an entirely different and higher level of
performance is demanded by the marketplace. Fiduciary action
aimed at simply avoiding liability may not be sufficient to maintain the investment management business of pension and retirement plan customers. Institutional customers interested in expanding investment classifications and holding certain types of

141.

See supra note 137.
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investments, such as real estate, for the long term may require
professional investment fiduciaries to do more than break even.
They may, in fact, require performance at a level which is significantly higher than performance objectively measured by such
criteria as Standard & Poor's or the Dow Jones Industrial
Average.

